Date: Mon, 24 Apr 95 18:52:58 -0400 From: Lawrence Morales Subject: Lev 18/20 Paper [preface] I wrote this paper for my Judaic Studies course, "Sex and Gender in Ancient Israel," at Brown University. It looks at various thoughts on the meanings of Lev 18:22 and 20:13, tries to assess their strengths and weaknesses, and then proposes an explanation that is somewhat of a mix of some of the stronger research that's been done on the topic. The paper's intended audience is primarily the students in the class & the professor, Saul Olyan. One thing we learned (or at least I did) in this course is that it is nearly impossile to obtain definitive answers on sex and gender topics from ancient Israelite texts. Many times we had to concede, "We just don't know!" Hence, the paper itself does not seek to give a final answer on the topic, only provide more food for thought and study. I think that the "results" can have relevence to the debate going on in spiritual communities over this broad topic. Specifically, seeing sex roles as socially constructed can be a significant factor in the discussion. However, such relevence is for later thought and consideration, and is not treated in this work. It's been YEARS since I wrote a term paper for a class (I'm a grad student in Math, taking this course for "fun"), so my writing style and ability has been stretched on this project. I welcome comments that would help me improve its structure, readability, and arguments. Also, if you have any questions about the terminology or references, I'll do my best to answer them via e-mail. Thanks...I hope it's helpful. The Meaning of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 in Their Social and Legal Context Lawrence Morales Judaic Studies 99B Spring, 1995 Professor Saul Olyan ===================================================================== The only direct reference to "homosexual" activity in the Hebrew Bible appears in Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13. Common translations of these texts are: You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination. (18:22) If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them. (20:13) These often lead to the common belief that men are not to have sex with other men as they would with women. As a result, "homosexuality," as we understand it and speak of it today, is often denounced as being contrary to God's laws. However, as frequently happens in efforts to translate ancient Biblical texts, there is a degree of interpretation that takes place when rendering the translations above. Literally, the texts say something more like: And with a male you shall not lie the lying down of a woman; it is an 'abomination'" (18:22) And as for the man who lies with a male the lying down of a woman, they-the two of them0-have committed an 'abomination'; they shall certainly be put to death. (20:13) The phrase, "the lying down of a woman," does not have obvious meaning, and may be an important key to discovering the meaning of these texts in their legal and cultural context. In this paper, I will examine some of the more common views concerning the meaning of these texts, and after doing so, use the strong points from some of them to propose a hybrid view which may help explain the meaning of these verses in their social and legal context. One popular reason given for the presence of these prohibitions is that these acts are associated with idolatrous practices. The basic idea is that Lev. 18:21, which condemns the offering of children to Molech, can be connected to verse 22. One immediate problem with this is that the other sexual practices in Lev. 19-20 and 23 do not seem to be associated in this way to idolatry. For instance, it's not often that adultery is prohibited because it incorporates idolatrous practices. However, Bigger says "homosexual intercourse was a perversion which may have been connected with idolatry and, since it involved the 'misuse of semen,' would put both individuals and society in great ritual danger."[1] He contends that the theme of verse 22 is the "sexual purity" [2] of the individual and seems to link it to idolatry and the "misuse of semen," but never really explains the meanings of these terms in any satisfactory way. Thurston provides a slightly different insight along these lines when he summarizes T. Horner's work. The "problem of homosexuality" is attributed to Persian influence and must be seen in the light of Deut. 23:17-18, the prohibition of "male and female cult prostitutes,"[3] which are to be equated with the abomination in Lev. 18:22. Thurston, however, points out that such a form of idolatry was not a problem during the Persian period. "A concern with idolatry must indicate an earlier origin of the passage. If Persian influence was a cause of the prohibition, concern about kedeshim was not."[4] Boswell states that "often 'toevah' specifically means 'idol,' and its connection with idolatry is patent even within the context of the passages regarding homosexual acts."[5] His basic view is that Lev. 18 and 20 are texts which deal with establishing the distinctiveness of Israel, specifically by prohibiting idolatry. Boswell mentions later Jewish commentaries such as the Talmud and the Maimonides in support of his view; however, these tell us little about ancient Israeli culture and are not enough to fully support his contentions. Furthermore, his assertion that its connection with idolatry is "patent" in this context seems unfounded, especially in light of the varied way in which the word is used in other places.[6] Boswell states that the word "toevah", translated abomination, "does not usually signify something intrinsically evil, like rape or theft (discussed elsewhere in Leviticus), but something which is ritually unclean for Jews, like eating pork or engaging in intercourse during menstruation"[7] In response, Greenburg says that Leviticus "does recognize forms of ritual uncleanness that are not morally condemned, e.g., childbirth, seminal emission, heterosexual intercourse, and menstruation."[8] Toevah is not used to describe these conditions at all. Coupled with the common misnomer that what is being prohibited here is actually cultic or temple prostitution, a practice that cannot be shown to have existed in the Israelite temple, this view is often offered as an explanation for the specific kind of "homosexual" activity being proscribed (idolatrous activity and/or temple prostitution), but the lack of evidence and consistency in the argument do not support the view. Instead, it seems to be a confusion between cultic issues and issues of idolatry.[9] Furthermore, Olyan says that it is "very likely" that 18:21 is "secondary to the series of laws in 18:19-23",[10] which would seem to invalidate the argument from the beginning. Another explanation offered for the prohibitions on "homosexual" acts is based on the assumption that sex has procreation as its primary objective. This seems to be a common view held on philosophical grounds by many, especially in the modern conservative Christian movement, and its logic stems from presuming that the purpose of sex is clearly revealed as procreation in the creation story. Those acts that do not lend themselves to at least the possibility of procreation are considered a violation of such a purpose. "Homosexual" acts would certainly fall under this category. Certain Biblical scholars also take this general approach, although possibly not with the same presuppositions. Eilburg Schwarz, noting the importance of procreation among the priestly writers, suggests that the integrity of Israelite lineage is threatened when incest, bestiality, child sacrifice, or intercourse during menstruation take place.[11] Specifically, such acts "waste Israelite seed." However, numerous other sexual activities "waste seed" and are not prohibited.[12] Legal texts say nothing about these scenarios. Another problem with this approach is that it often implies that many or all sexual acts between two men are prohibited by Lev. 18 and 20. However, there is reason to believe that the Lev. 18 and 20 passages are not blanket statements against all same-sex behavior, but that specific activities are being prohibited.[13] And finally, if the purpose of the passage is to condemn same-sex acts that don't have any possibility of procreation, why is there no condemnation of female-female sexual acts in the legal writings? The next major approach to these texts incorporates the ideas of mixing. Specifically, these sexual acts are being prohibited because they mix two substances, persons, or ideas together that are meant to be kept apart. There are two major forms of mixing that are pertinent to this discussion. The first is the mixing of defiling fluids or substances, the second is the mixing of kinds. First we consider the mixing of defiling fluids or substances. Bigger states that "both semen and menstrual blood were defiling on their own, and mingled together these presented a double threat which was thought to bring danger onto the entire community."[14] As an example, the possibility that the semen of a husband and another man committing adultery with his wife may explain the prohibition against adultery.[15] My problem with this is the assertion that this mingling poses a "double threat." I don't see any textual justification for it. It also doesn't provide an explanation that is as comprehensive as is possible.[16] For example, incest does not appear to be covered under these conditions. Olyan extends this idea to offer his own explanation for why these Levitical prohibitions against "homosexual" acts exist. Using Ezekiel 4:9-15, which is thought to share H's purity system, Olyan assumes that excrement also defiles. Thus, Lev. 18:22 and 20:13 are present to "prevent two otherwise defiling agents (semen and excrement)...from mingling in the body of the receptive partner."[17] There are difficulties with this, which he acknowledges. For instance, why is there no ban on male-female anal intercourse? Olyan responds by saying that anal intercourse is not mentioned in any Israelite context and hence may not have been a part of the "Israelite repertoire of sexual acts."[18] However, masturbation isn't prohibited either and I doubt many would claim that its absence in the text necessarily implies an absence in practice. Another potential problem with this overall approach arises from his likely claim that only anal intercourse is prohibited in Lev. 18:22 and 20:13. What about male-male sexual acts (other than anal intercourse) which might have mixed semen and semen? There is no mention of those either. We now consider the concern over mixing of kinds. Many have undertaken the challenge of fleshing out the rationale behind the Purity Code. What unifies the laws? What principles lie behind the system? Mary Douglas, in her well-read and frequently-quoted work, states that Any interpretations will fail which take the Do-Nots of the Old Testament in piecemeal fashion...there must be contrariness between holiness and abomination which will make over-all sense of the particular restrictions.[19] Douglas develops the idea that the Levitical approach to holiness is connected to the ideas of completeness, or wholeness in God's creation.[20] According to Douglas' treatment of the topic, there are basically two requirements that are consequences of this notion of wholeness. First, every individual must be a self-contained specimen of its own kind. So, for example, if a man suffers from any "blemish," he may not officiate in a priestly manner, even if he is entitled to such a position by descent, because the blemish compromises his wholeness and hence disqualifies him from service. Also, if an animal does not match up with the basic notion of what a "land animal" is, it is essentially incomplete with respect to this notion and is declared unclean. This general idea can be used to try to understand the regulations pertaining to dietary laws, clean and unclean animals, menstruation and other genital emissions, and the consumption of blood, among others. Second, and of more importance here, there is to be no mixing of kinds. If things which do not belong to the same class or kind get mixed, pollution takes place. Such mixing confuses the wholeness of the individual persons, animals, or substances and is to be avoided. "Holiness means keeping distinct the categories of creation."[21] Thus incest and adultery violate the "simple sense of right order,"[22] different species of animals must not be cross-bred (Lev. 19:19), a field cannot have two different kinds of seeds in it (Lev. 19:19), bestiality is forbidden (Lev. 18:23), and wearing garments of blended fabrics is taboo (Lev. 19:19). Thurston extends Douglas' analysis by stating that the prohibition in Lev. 18:22 emerges from this concept of non-mixing. In "lying with a male as with a woman,"[23] the receptive partner is "not conforming to his class, but acting as a woman." As Olyan points out, there is a possible problem with this approach. If Lev. 18:22 and the original version of 20:13 only addressed the insertive partner,[24] or if the final version of 20:13 never intended the receptive partner to be central in the prohibition, then the concern with a male acting as a woman would not be consistent with the intent of the passages. Specifically, "it seems unlikely that the laws were ever motivated by a concern that the anally receptive male conform to his class."[25] However, I believe that with some modifications, this general approach, which takes into account gender issues, may be the key to understanding the passages. One of the most appealing approaches to unlocking the meaning of the these passages involves gender issues and the mixing of gender roles. This general approach to the subject essentially states that "homosexual" acts are prohibited in Lev. 18 and 20 because certain gender boundaries are violated when a man is penetrated, a role generally reserved for a female in Israelite society. In this case, gender boundaries are violated because a mixing of gender roles occurs. There are at least two positive facets of such an approach, in my opinion. First, it takes into account the importance of gender roles in Israeli culture. It is evident from Israeli sources both in and out of the Holiness Code that there are very specific gender boundaries established for Israelite men and women. In religious service and participation, labor assignments, economic functioning, familial roles, and a host of other arenas, varying degrees of gender delineation are spelled out in ancient Israelite writings. I find it reasonable that such roles would appear in sexual matters, and in fact would be surprised if they did not. Next, this approach nicely incorporates the idea of "mixing" that Douglas develops, and takes into account the immediate context of the verse: Lev. 18:23, the next verse, calls bestiality "tebel", literally "mixing," commonly translated "perversion."[26] Here, the specific idea of prohibiting an action because it is "mixing" appears; thus, understanding verse 22 in light of a concern over mixing lends some uniformity and parallelisim to the context which may have been intended by the author. Unfortunately, it appears that when this approach is taken, it is primarily the receptive partner who is condemned for acting like a woman, which may be only part of the reason for the prohibition. Except in the punishment phase the insertive partner is often not even considered, which may run contrary to the way in which legal texts appear to have been addressed at that time.[27] However, I believe that some of these ideas can be merged (or modified) to arrive at an approach which has several strengths in its favor. Essentially, I think that the Levitical passages prohibit anal intercourse between two men because the insertive partner, considered the active agent in sexual matters in ancient Israel, causes his partner to cross cultural gender boundaries by mixing his gender kind and violating the general principal of wholeness associated with holiness in the Purity Code (as described by Douglas.) Furthermore, the addition of the receptive partner in Lev. 20, although possibly not part of the original proscription, serves to punish the receptive partner for allowing such a mixing to occur.[28] Thus, the insertive partner is the central concern because of his active role in the process, but the receptive partner still remains a part of the general concern. The first issue to deal with is the question of what exactly is being prohibited in these texts. Current "conservative" readings of these verses see a blanketed restriction on all "homosexual" acts. There are many who extend the verse to state that all romantic same-sex expressions and, in some cases, even the condition of homosexuality (as we understand it today) are condemned. However, an examination of the structure of the texts indicate that it is only anal penetration that is of concern to the author. I will only summarize Olyan's argument on the subject.[29] The meaning of these passages is made difficult by the term "miskebe issa", which is commonly rendered "as with a woman," but is more literally translated "the lying down of a woman." To help deal with this difficulty, Olyan studies the use of a related idiom, "miskab zakar", which can be translated "the lying down of a male." By examining the places where "miskab zakar" appears,[30] Olyan concludes that "the idiom miskab zakar must mean specifically male vaginal penetration in these contexts: the experience of "miskab zakar" defines a nonvirgin over against a virgin."[31] Olyan's most speculative jump in his treatment of these phrases occurs when he assumes that "miskebe issa" ("the lying down of a woman") and miskab zakar ("the lying down of a male") are a pair. While the assertion is not unreasonable, it still remains the "weak link" in the argument, from what I can tell. But supposing its validity, Olyan argues that such a pairing would restrict the meaning of "miskebe issa" in the same way that "miskab zakar" seems to be restricted. So, if a female experiences "miskab zakar," or male vaginal penetration, then "miskebe issa," which can be said to be vaginal receptivity, is experienced by a male. In other words, a female experiences the penetration of a male (miskab zakar), while the male experiences the reception of a female (miskebe issa). Thus, in the Levitical passages, the prohibition is on male-male penetration, specifically anal intercourse. Thurston also states that anal intercourse is that which is being forbidden, but gives no reasons for making this statement.[32] Boyarin points out that the Talmud understood that the biblical prohibitions on male intercourse applied only to anal intercourse.[33] Although the Talmud cannot be used to directly support any conclusions on the meaning of the Levitical prohibitions, we at least have confirmation that such a view is not original nor unimaginable. The next issue is determining who is being addressed in the passages. Olyan states that it is the insertive partner that is being primarily addressed.[34] Arguing that in other legal contexts men are commanded not "to lie with" certain female partners, and that the idiom "to lie with" is used exclusively of insertive partners in legal settings, he extends this principle to Lev. 18:22 and 20:13. He also suggests that the bounding of receptivity exclusively to women causes the receptive partner in a male-male situation to be viewed as the equivalent of a female, from a legal stance. Hence, since male landowners who are household heads, and not women, are generally those addressed in legal contexts, the penetrator, occupying the male "role", is the party directly addressed in Lev. 18:22 and 20:13. Anothe argument he makes, from logic, is that to say that a man should no "lie the lying down of a woman" with a male would imply that it is acceptable to "lie the lying down of a woman" with a female, since the terms appear to be paired together. Olyan does not think the receptive partner is being addressed directly, at least not in the original formulation of the law, since the law (at least in Lev. 18) is state in the masculine singular, and because there is reason to believe that the latter part of 20:13, "they-the two of them-have committed an abomination; they shall certainly be put to death," in its awkward form, was a product of later redactorial activity.[35] Olyan uses this to steer clear of some of the gender-based arguments of Thurston (and I would presume of Boyarin), but I don't believe the fact that the receptive partner may have never played a central role in the legal formulation necessarily eliminates gender- based issues as the motivation behind the prohibition. First, Lev. 18:22 and 20:13 are both in the H source, and there is no way of knowing (as far as I can tell) how much later such a redaction might have taken place. If H was a group, or a school of thought that evolved over a period of time, Lev. 20:13 might have served as clarification of 18:22. I thind what may be important is that they exist within the same frame of reference. I agree that it would probably be incorrect to make the receptive partner the central focus of the proscription, but don't see why the presence of both in the final formulation cannot be consistent with a gender-based viewpoint. This leads into the key question of why such male-male activity was prohibited in the context of the Holiness Code. This is not unrelated to the two foundational sub-issues just discussed. It is because anal intercourse is the activity prohibited and it is because the insertive partner is probably the main concern of the author that I propose the following. Briefly, I think that the prohibition is there because the insertive partner compromises the "wholeness" of the receptive partner, causing him to violate gender boundaries and on notions of what is a male and what is a female in Israelite culture. The receptive partner is included in Lev. 20:13 to account for his allowing this violation to take place. In order to give this argument weight, we must have some reason to link the insertive verses receptive issue with gender concerns.[36] Olyan seems to employ his arguments based on the uses of miskebe issa and miskaba zakar to conclude that "receptivity is bounded on the basis of biological sex; it is constructed as appropriate exclusively to females; it is gendered as feminine,"[37] but admits that neither the texts themselves nor the "framing materials" provide insight as to why this is so. He also points out that in Athenian and Roman societies, "inappropriate penetration was frequently likened to feminization: to be penetrated was to be feminized,"[38] and, perhaps more importantly, cites evidence from Middle Assyrian Laws that link male receptivity in anal intercourse with feminization.[39] Boyarin also adds an interesting comment on this matter, observing that the word for female in biblical Hebrew means "orifice bearer."[40] He also gives distant, although possibly helpful, information when he details Talmudic interpretations consistent with this view. He concludes, "Men penetrate, women are penetrated; so for a man to be penetrated constitutes a 'mixing of kinds' analogous to cross dressing."[41] If this is assumed, then we can consider the possibility that anal intercourse was prohibited because it "feminized" the receptive partner [42] and "mixed" gender roles and compromised the "wholeness" of the receptive partner. In a society with well demarcated gender lines, this sort of concern seems natural. With this supposition, it is easier to understand why the receptive partner is condemned in the (possibly) redacted version of the law in Lev. 20. I have stated earlier that I think that the receptive partner is also condemned because he allows himself to be "mixed," so to speak. I offer a similar Biblical reference to try to support this general idea. In Deut. 22:23-24, if a betrothed virgin is raped in the city, both she and the perpetrator are to be stoned at the city gate. Her sentence is given because "she did not cry for help, though she was in the city," with the implication being that she would have been heard by someone else in the city if she had cried out for help. However, verses 25 and 26, give a different scenario. There, a woman who is raped in the country is not punished, because it is presumed she cried out for help but could not be heard, being outside of the crowded city. Hence, guilt is assigned only if there is an indication that she allowed this violation to take place. If Olyan is correct, then in this legal context, the male would be directly addressed, yet the female can also have blame assigned to her. Although the violation is different in nature (mixing of kinds versus violation of sexual property), I believe there is a general principal here that might apply to the Lev. passages in question. The receptive partner, although not perceived to be active (neither is the rape victim), bears responsibility for allowing the mixing to occur. There are a couple of potential problems with this approach, however. For instance, the Deut. passage deals with rape, while the Lev. passages don't specify if the insertion is coerced. Also, Lev. 20:15-16 establishes that both a person and an animal involved in cases of bestiality are to be killed. It would seem that in general, the animal would not offer consent of the kind equivalent to cases of male-male intercourse or other human sexual violations. However, it is interesting to note that in the case of a male, the man is "to be put to death," while the animal is to be "killed." But in the case of a female, "they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them," seeming to imply some level of joint responsibility. Whatever the case was, it may provide difficulties, but I don't think they are fatal to the overall approach. This general explanation for understanding the meaning of Lev. 18:22 & 20:13 in the wider context of the Holiness Code has some strong advantages. First it fits well into the comprehensive model that Douglas has carefully provided. By viewing anal penetration as a mixing, the texts nicely fit into a system that is neither haphazard nor random. Second, it integrates the concept of gender roles into our understanding of these verses. I feel this is important because of the heavily gendered character of ancient Israelite society. Men and women seem to have had very specific roles to fill, depending on the circumstances. Violations of these boundaries and roles appear to have been frowned upon. For example, this idea of protecting and maintaining gender roles also appears in Deut. 22:5, where cross dressing by both men and women is prohibited and called an "abomination," the same word appearing in Lev. 18:22 and 20:13. Boyarin suggests that the "semantic/syntactic parallelism of 'a woman's garment' and 'a woman's lyings' ... suggest a cultural relation between them."[43] In either case, there is a confusion of gender or kinds. The person is not whole with respect to their own gender. Third, this general approach also helps to explain why female "homosexual" acts are not forbidden anywhere in the Hebrew Bible. If penile penetration is the defining aspect of sex, as it appears to be, then such acts do not cause a mixing of kinds and thus do not merit condemnation. If the authors were actually concerned with all "homosexual" behavior or "homosexuality" as a condition, as is often assumed by casual readers of these texts, then one would assume that a society as obsessed with sex would mention something about this. Fourth, this approach takes advantage of the specific mention of "mixing" in Lev. 18:23, where bestiality is called tebel, "mixing," commonly translated "perversion." Here, the specific idea of prohibiting an action because it is "mixing" appears; thus, understanding verse 22 in light of a concern over mixing lends some uniformity to the context and its intent. In light of the recent increase in discussion over the place, treatment, and rights of gay and lesbian persons in society and in the religious institutions of our country, it is important that our views be based on the careful examination of facts available to us. Religious forces in society are gaining political power which has potentially dangerous implications for certain groups. Hence, information which educates and clarifies Biblical teachings is essential in the overall process of protecting the dignity of all members of our society. This paper, and the excellent sources it draws from, is an attempt to provide a portion of this information. The texts in Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 have long been used to justify beliefs that are most likely unfounded within the text themselves. From the numerous views that have been proposed, a "mixing" of strong points provides a possible explanation for the role of these verses that is strongly rooted in the text and fits well into a larger, rational and systematic explanation of Biblical Law. These verses most likely condemn a specific act: anal penetration. They probably address a central person, the penetrator, with the receiving partner playing a smaller, but still significant role. And they prohibit these acts because of socially constructed gender boundaries that state what roles men and women play in the sexual realm. Any interpretation of them which extends condemnation to "homosexuality," or to all "homosexual" acts is most likely unjustified by the texts themselves or the legal context within which they occur. ====================================================================== ENDNOTES [1] S. Bigger, "The Family Laws of Leviticus 18 in Their Setting," in Journal of Biblical Literature 98 (1979), p. 201-202. [2] Ibid, p. 201. [3] Translated from "kedeshim," which literally means "holy ones." There is little evidence to believe that temple prostitution existed in Isralite culture, contrary to popular belief. [4] T. M. Thurston, "Leviticus 18:22 and the Prohibition of Homosexual Acts," in Homophobia and the Judeo-Christian Tradition, ed. M.L. Stemmeler and J.M. Clark (Dallas, 1989), p. 10. [5] J. Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago, 1980), p. 100. [6] It is used to describe such various things as certain animals (Deut14:3), offering up animal sacrifices that have defects (Deut 17:1), justifying the wicked while condemning the righteous (Prov 17:15) and cross dressing by either men or women (Deut 22:5). It's used in Gen. 46:34 (to describe how Egyptians view shepherds), Deut 7:25-26 (coveting the gold of idols), 22:5 (crossdressing), 23:18 (bringing a harlot or a "dog" into the house of the LORD), 24:4 (marrying a former husband after a second husband dies or divorces her), 25:16 (using unjust weights), 2Kin23:13, Isa 1:13 (incense, vain offerings), Jer 7:10 (theft, murder, adultery, searing falsely, burning incense to BaUal, going after other gods), Prov 12:22 (lying lips), 15:8 sacrifice of the wicked), 15:26 (thoughts of the wicked), 16:5 (arrogant people), and 17:15 (unjust judgements). [7] Boswell, p. 100. [8] D.E. Greenburg, The Construction of Homosexuality, (Chicago, 1988), pp. 195-96. [9] Thurston, p. 11. [10] S. Olyan, "And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13," in Journal of History of Sexuality, vol. 5, no. 2, (Chicago, 1994) p.198. Thurston states that this claim is given weight by Karl Elliger in "Kas Gesetz Leviticus 18," in Zeitschrift fur die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 67 (1955), p.17, but the language is inaccesable to me. [11] H. Eilburg Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism, (Bloomington, IN, 1990), p. 183. [12] This argument can be extended to modern discussions when this approach is taken: What should be said about situations where procreation cannot take place, for medical reasons? Or those people who choose to stay childless, or single and without children? [13] See later arguments. [14] Bigger, p. 202. [15] Ibid. [16] See discussion below on Douglas' work. [17] Olyan, p. 203. [18] Ibid. [19] M. Douglas, Purity and Danger, (1966; reprint London, 1979), p49. [20] See L.W. Countryman, Dirt, Greed and Sex, (Philadelphia, 1988) pp. 24-28 for a helpful interpretation of Douglas' work. Countryman, however, does not seem to provide an explanation for the logic behind the Levitical passages. [21] Douglas, p. 53. [22] Ibid. [23] Thurston, p. 16. [24] See discussion following. [25] Olyan, p. 199. [26] I am unsure why "perversion" is chosen here. Perhaps to say that "you shall not lie with any beast...it is mixing," provides translators with a difficulty. [27] See discussion below. [28] While preparing this paper and formulating this view, I came across Daniel Boyarin, "Are There Any Jews in The History of Sexuality?," in Journal of the History of Sexuality, vol. 5, no. 3, (Chicago 1994), pp. 333-355, which essentially says the same thing. I will some of his arguments to clarify my own and possibly add comments that might strengthen the position slightly. Nonetheless, priority is his. [29] Olyan, pp. 183-186. [30] Num. 31:17,18,35; Judg. 21:11,12. [31] Olyan, p. 184. [32] Thurston, p16. [33] Boyarin, p. 336. See 25 above for reference. [34] Olyan, p. 186. [35] Ibid, p. 187. Compare with Lev 20:10,13 for a similar case of possible redactorial activity. [36] The evidence, however, does not appear to be as strong as I'd like. If there is a weakest link in my reasoning, I would think it would be here. [37] Ibid, p. 188. [38] Ibid, p. 191. For more information on Athenian and Roman views on this, see D.M. Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality (New York, 1990), pp. 29-39. [39] Ibid, p. 194. [40] Boyarin, p. 346. [41] Ibid, p. 347. [42] Olyan suggests that the penetrator may been viewed before the final form of the law as the only one condemned, possibly for causing the "feminization" of his partner, or because he did not conform to his gender class because of the choice of his partner. This is a slighly different than what I'm saying here, but still views the issue from very similar point of view. [43] Boyarin, p. 343. ===================================================================== BIBLIOGRAPHY Baile, D., Eros and the Jews, (New York, 1992). Bigger, S. , "The Family Laws of Leviticus 18 in Their Setting," in Journal of Biblical Literature 98 (1979). Boswell, J., Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago, 1980). Boyarin, D., "Are There Any Jews in 'The History of Sexuality'?," in Journal of the History of Sexuality, vol. 5, no. 3, (Chicago, 1994). Countryman, L.W., Dirt, Greed and Sex, (Philadelphia, 1988). Douglas, M., Purity and Danger, (1966; reprint London, 1979). Eilburg Schwartz, H., The Savage in Judaism, (Bloomington, IN, 1990). Greenburg, D.E., The Construction of Homosexuality, (Chicago, 1988). Halperin, D.M., One Hundred Years of Homosexuality (New York, 1990). Olyan, S., "And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman: On the Meaning and Significance of leviticus 18:22 and 20:13," in Journal of History of Sexuality, vol. 5, no. 2, (Chicago, 1994). Scroggs, R., The New Testament and Homosexuality, (Philadelphia, 1983). Thurston, T.M., "Leviticus 18:22 and the Prohibition of Homosexual Acts," in Homophobia and the Judeo-Christian Tradition, ed. M.L. Stemmeler and J.M. Clark (Dallas, 1989).